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ABSTRACT 
 
Murphy (2006) criticizes psychiatric nosology from the perspective of the philosophy of 
science, arguing that the model of pathology as encapsulated in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders reflects a folk conception of the mental, and of 
malfunctioning, that is inadequately integrated with cognitive and behavioral 
neuroscience. The present paper supports this view through a case study of research on 
pathological gambling. It argues that recent modeling based on fMRI studies and 
behavioral genetics suggests a stipulative, non-seamless reduction of pathological 
gambling to a specific disorder of the mesolimbic dopamine system. This argument is 
agnostic as between prior philosophical commitments to realism or empiricism. 
 
Word count, abstract: 106 
Word count, text (including references and notes): 4,875 
 1. Introduction 
 
Systematic research into gambling behavior, especially problem and pathological 
gambling, has become a substantial academic industry. Several research centers and an 
annual conference draw investigators from psychiatry, psychology, neuroscience, and 
social sciences (particularly economics). Historical moments when interdisciplinary 
research matrices converge on norms that guide grant and journal reviewers are good 
opportunities for study by philosophers of science. They are also the occasions when 
philosophers of science can most usefully make contributions to science, since they are 
the junctures at which the relevant scientists will often agree that conceptual uncertainties 
merit self-conscious attention. The current state of gambling behavior research 
exemplifies this situation, while also revealing features specific to conceptual 
stabilization at the intersection among psychiatry, neuroscience and social science. 
 
Murphy (2006) criticizes standard practice in psychiatric nosology as a philosopher of 
science. He argues that the model of pathology encapsulated in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (henceforth DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric 
Association 2000) reflects a folk conception of the mental, and of malfunctioning, that is 
inadequately integrated with cognitive and behavioral neuroscience. The present paper 
supports this view in the specific instance of pathological gambling.1 The case does not 
rely on philosophical presuppositions of realism or empiricism, either of which, if 
dogmatically conventionalized in a science, would unduly constrain opportunism. 
However, realism and empiricism are useful constructs for describing particular trade-
offs that scientists make between the motive to find unifying explanatory (causal) 
mechanisms (realism) and exploitation of statistical testing power provided by reduced-
form models that are agnostic about constituents of model-independent reality 
(empiricism).  
 
2. The DSM operationalization of pathological gambling 
 
From clinical lore gambling research inherited distinct constructs of ‘problem’ and 
‘pathological’ gambling. This classification was motivated by reference to social criteria: 
some people’s gambling is widely deemed to be generally socially catastrophic (to 
gamblers and usually their families), while other people’s gambling wanders in and out of 
bounds set by norms regulating ‘appropriate’ behavior. This construction of problem and 
pathological gambling has been based on an established popular distinction between 
‘problem drinking’ and ‘alcoholism’. 
 
                                                
1 A caveat is that I don’t agree with Murphy that successful psychiatric science requires a 
general account of abnormal mental functioning – different disorders constitute disorders 
for different kinds of reasons. Thanks to Harold Kincaid for this point. 
Typically for research motivated by social concerns, the earliest research on problem and 
pathological gambling concentrated on establishing quantitative magnitudes – mainly, 
prevalence rates and aggregate social costs. This research has avoided mapping the 
problem / pathological gambling distinction onto any hypothesized distinction ‘internal 
to’ the minds or brains of disordered gamblers. Researchers have instead relied on 
operationalizations referenced to social-behavioral consequences. Studies gather subject 
samples of suitable size and representativeness for estimating proportions of target 
populations that gamble never, ‘occasionally’, ‘regularly’, and ‘very frequently’, and 
proportions that gamble more than the gamblers or their families wish they did. The first 
three categories refer to social norms, and the fourth category is not presupposed to be a 
strict subset of the third. What makes prevalence estimation scientific, along with sound 
analysis, is attention to cross-study comparability: similar methods are applied 
recurrently in different populations. We have evidence that prevalence estimates track a 
phenomenon stable enough for accumulation of knowledge just in case we discover 
similar category proportions in various populations after controlling for hypothetically 
relevant environmental conditions (e.g. availability of gambling opportunities). 
 
Prevalence estimation is characteristic of a ‘phenomena counting’ stage of science, 
preceding experimental and theoretical refinement. Policy, clinical and diagnostic 
practices reliant on the problem / pathological distinction have not been able to wait for 
the science to mature. This does not mean that practice has ignored ongoing science 
pending its maturity. Clinicians and policy makers generally suppose that responsible 
policy at a given time t should reflect whatever scientists have agreed upon by t. 
Furthermore, since funding for research on pathologies is mainly motivated by clinical 
imperatives, distinctions used in diagnosis condition the formulation of hypotheses. Thus 
scientific and clinical conceptualizations mutually interact, but clinical practices and 
principles dominate the interaction.   
 
Let us idealize ‘scientific’ isolation of a phenomenon as the identification of a causal 
regularity, relation or disposition that holds under a specified range of conditions.2 
Although clinical communities stabilize syndrome concepts in ways that depart further 
from this ideal than mature scientific research programs, clinicians’ convergence on 
shared diagnostic criteria is not unsystematic. First, practitioners report symptoms they 
observe occurring together in their accidental patient samples. These reports are 
published in journals of patient observations, which are periodically reviewed by meta-
analysts in search of co-morbidity patterns that significantly recur. Where such patterns 
can’t be explained as consequences of the interactions of already established syndromes, 
they become the basis for new diagnoses. Once there is approximate consensus on a 
diagnosis and on the best treatment given current knowledge and technology, this is 
published in a diagnostic manual. Manual entries do more than summarize observations. 
They also refine diagnostic practice by supplying standard tests for confirmation. This 
allows clinicians to refer patients along through treatment networks using diagnostic 
                                                
2 This formulation is intended as neutral among philosophies of science; it might refer to 
Humean regularities, to nomological relations among ‘natural kinds’, to Cartwright’s 
(1992) ‘Aristotelian natures’, or to functional dependencies among restricted parametric 
ranges of variables in models with specified domains of application. 
labels that are interpreted in roughly the same way by everyone who consults the 
patient’s file. 
 
Based on this practice, DSM-IV operationalizes ‘pathological gambling’ as: 
 
A chronic inability to refrain from gambling to an extent that causes serious 
disruption to core life aspects such as career, health and family. A person is 
diagnosed as a probable pathological gambler if they agree with five or more of 
the following statements: 
 
1. You have often gambled longer than you had planned.  
2. You have often gambled until your last dollar was gone.  
3. Thoughts of gambling have caused you to lose sleep.  
4. You have used your income or savings to gamble while letting bills go 
unpaid.  
5. You have made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to stop gambling.  
6. You have broken the law or considered breaking the law to finance 
your gambling.  
7. You have borrowed money to finance your gambling.  
8. You have felt depressed or suicidal because of your gambling losses.  
9. You have been remorseful after gambling.  
10. You have gambled to get money to meet your financial obligations. 
 
As with other DSM entries, this is an operationalization in a precise sense, intended as the 
basis for constructing diagnostic screens for administration to reporting patients. The 
belief that most people with serious gambling disorders will agree with five or more of 
the statements above is not based on scientific research but on anecdotal clinical lore, and 
on a tradition brought over from more extensive psychiatric experience with patterns in 
alcohol dependence. 
 
‘Problem gambling’ is not defined in DSM-IV. Nevertheless, the US Committee on the 
Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, composed mainly of scientists, 
operationalizes problem gambling as “gambling behavior that results in any harmful 
effects to the gambler, his or her family, significant others, friends, co-workers etc.” 
(National Research Council 1999, 21). Though the Committee endorsed the DSM 
operationalization of ‘pathological gambling’ and explicitly defined ‘disordered 
gambling’ as the union of pathological and problem gambling, its operationalization of 
the latter is unconnected to any screen. Taken literally, it is clinically unhelpful: losing $5 
on a football bet or being late for lunch due to a queue at the betting window constitute 
‘harmful effects’ of gambling, however trivial. Since ‘problem gambling’ is intended to 
denote a warning condition for vulnerability to pathological gambling, one might expect 
that operationalizations of the two ideas should have a common basis: an assessor should 
be able to use the same screen by which she identifies pathological gamblers to identify 
problem gamblers, applying a lower threshold for the latter. However, screens based on 
the DSM reflect no principled underlying scale robust under transformations to 
alternative threshold tests. Clinicians do not treat the statements in the DSM 
operationalization as equally diagnostic. Agreement with statements (5), (6) or (10) is 
taken to indicate a probable serious gambling problem, and likewise for (8) if ‘depressed’ 
is interpreted clinically. This cannot be said of the other statements barring special 
interpretations. These asymmetries make it unclear what ‘lowering the threshold’ on 
DSM-based screens might systematically mean.  
 
Despite its unclarity, there are practical motivations for retaining the ‘problem gambling’ 
construct. There is consensus in the gambling industry, in the treatment community and 
among regulators that large numbers of gamblers occasionally lose more money than they 
judge they can comfortably afford, while a much smaller proportion find their lives and 
welfare catastrophically impaired by relentless cravings to gamble. There is thus an 
acknowledged public health interest in determining whether there is a scientific basis for 
hypothesizing a qualitative ‘jump’ between typical consumers of gambling services with 
imperfect self-control, and truly addicted gamblers who should be treated according to 
precedents for Axis-I psychiatric disorders. Most casinos aim to identify and then exclude 
addicted gamblers, but not those who merely occasionally gamble more than they 
intended to. If there is not a qualitative jump between these types, and any frequency of 
self-control lapses has predictive significance for probability of developing a psychiatric 
disorder, then casino and lottery operators carry potentially dramatic levels of ethical 
responsibility. On the other hand, if pathological gambling is a distinctive and relatively 
sui generis condition, then operators might hope that their problem is no trickier in 
principle than aiming to keep people with tuberculosis off jetliners. 
 
Conceptual questions about the relationship between minor and severe gambling 
problems have therefore been framed as questions about the ontogeny of the latter given 
rates of the former. Prevalence studies have proven largely uninformative here. They 
have generated consensus that, for any population, adolescent prevalence is at least three 
times higher than among adults. However, alcohol and drug use studies show that the 
majority of adolescents who consume at rates which in an adult would be regarded as 
reliable indicators of addiction endogenously reduce these rates by their late twenties. 
Thus, though it appears that most addicted adults were impulsively consuming 
adolescents, most impulsively consuming adolescents don’t become addicted adults. 
Treatment community lore holds that pathological gamblers often enjoyed statistically 
deviant win frequencies in their first gambling experiences, which, it is conjectured, leads 
to over-estimation of expected payoffs that is for some reason difficult to un-learn 
(Collins 2003). However, this idea has never been tested in a longitudinal treatment. 
 
This unsatisfactory conceptual impasse is not simply a function of the recentness of 
gambling behavior science. It reflects principled epistemological problems with the 
reliance on clinical screens in research. 
 
3. Clinical screens as research instruments 
 
For conditions that can cause serious harm, the imperative to help suffering people has 
higher social priority than scientific knowledge. In screening to identify pathological 
gamblers, the treatment community prefers to err on the side of diagnosing risk in some 
people who aren’t really in trouble, in order to avoid false negatives. Clinical screens are 
open to criticism if they do not build in this bias. This creates a dilemma for scientists 
choosing screens to select research samples. Use of clinical screens will over-estimate 
prevalence rates. If scientists instead develop customized research screens that aim to 
avoid bias, clinical and research samples will fail to match. This is problematic. Subject 
recruitment for studies of low-prevalence conditions, such as pathological gambling, is 
expensive. Practical considerations require frequent reliance on samples already 
assembled for treatment purposes, especially when an aspect of a research project is 
evaluation of a therapeutic approach. Ethical complications then arise because research 
cannot be concealed from its subjects. If we re-classify clinical populations to correct for 
screen bias, this sends patients confusing signals that may undermine their recovery. Thus 
most studies of pathological gambling have used samples that were sorted into treatment 
and control groups using clinical screens. This has had several important consequences.  
 
First, it has created major uncertainties in prevalence estimation. One instrument, the 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) (Lesieur and Blume 1987), had featured in 90% of 
published studies as of a survey by Dickerson and Baron (2000). The SOGS can be self-
administered by respondents, which is cost-efficient in large samples because it avoids 
the need for reliance on qualified administrators of structured clinical interviews. 
However, its tendency to harvest false positives appears to be large even for clinical 
screens. Most textbooks and surveys cite ‘typical’ pathological gambling prevalence 
estimates in jurisdictions with legal casinos as 1% to 4% of adults. Ladouceur (personal 
correspondence), a leading pioneer of  gambling research, anecdotally estimates the false 
positive rate produced by SOGS-based estimation at at least 1:1, and recent systematic 
evidence supports this guess. New screens have been developed which, while still based 
on DSM criteria, better match the findings of structured clinical interviews than the 
SOGS. Using one of these instruments (Ferris and Wynne 2001), the British Gambling 
Prevalence Survey (Wardle et al 2007) produced an estimate of 0.5%. This corresponds 
closely to the result of the most rigorous prevalence study ever conducted, the Gambling 
and Co-occurring Disorders component of the US National Comorbidity Survey (Kessler 
2007). In that study, full structured clinical interviews administered to a random sample 
of over 9,000 adults generated a prevalence estimate of 0.7%.   
 
Second, in considering any inference of causal relationships from relative efficacies of 
therapies, one must know the average or marginal severity of pathology to which the 
screen used to recruit subjects was sensitive. Consider two hypothetical screens A and B. 
Suppose that screen A consistently produces samples in which the median subject agrees 
with 8 statements in the DSM-IV operationalization, while the median subject recruited 
by screen B agrees with 6 of them. One would then have reason to expect that research 
using screen B will more likely suggest that a given policy or therapy is effective than 
research on that same policy or therapy that recruits and pools subjects by means of 
screen A, because the A-screened samples will contain higher proportions of severe 
cases. On the other hand, as noted, not all the DSM-IV criteria are of equal diagnostic 
weight. Suppose, for example, that more of the B-screened subjects agree with statements 
(5) and (6). 
 
Third, a major research question, indicated above, is whether there is a qualitative jump, 
revealed by some quantitative discontinuity on some measurable parameter, between sub-
groups of disordered gamblers. However, as we saw, prevalence work based on clinical 
screens is ill suited to shedding light on this. Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) argue that 
there are three different kinds of pathological gambler, that each kind has a different 
etiology, and that people suffering from each kind respond best to different interventions. 
Where diagnostic screens are concerned, this suggests the possibility of different scales 
with discontinuities at different measurement points of magnitudes of different variables. 
So long as we are relying on operationalizations of folk concepts instead of functional 
relationships represented in exact models, we should therefore ideally run every test we 
think is important on several groups of subjects recruited using different screens, and run 
regressions. But then absence of a common underlying model would block attempts to 
estimate the contributions of different variable values to different group memberships. 
 
Failure to apply a scientific model to identification of pathological gamblers also makes it 
difficult to integrate study of the phenomenon with investigations of mental health more 
generally. Considerable activity has aimed at estimating the tendency of pathological 
gamblers to manifest Axis-I comorbidities (substance dependence, depression, 
schizophrenia, and anti-social personality disorder). Discovering stable comorbidity rates 
across populations of pathological gamblers, if there are any, would be helpful for a 
number of reasons. First, it would help predict the likelihood that a given person is at risk 
for pathological gambling. Second, it would be relevant to design of treatments and 
interventions, possibly explaining some patterns of success and failure: interventions that 
work for pathological gamblers who lack certain comorbidities might fail for others who 
don’t (see, e.g., Ladd and Petry 2003). Third, efforts to explain stable cormorbidity 
patterns might lead us toward the explanation of pathological gambling itself if 
pathological gambling and comorbidities are sometimes or often consequences of 
common factors. Comorbidity data are what mainly motivate Blaszczynski and Nower’s 
thesis concerning different kinds of pathological gamblers. They report that across studies 
with larger numbers of subjects, stable proportions of pathological gamblers show 
cormorbidity with, respectively (i) nothing, (ii) depression and other mood disorders, and 
(iii) anti-social personality disorder. Subjects in these groups respond differentially to 
therapies. Blaszczynski and Nower then argue, more controversially, that the different 
comorbid factors causally contribute to pathological gambling in different ways.  
 
Most recent gambling policy attends to scientific research on gambling out of interest in 
the extent to which availability of commercial gambling opportunities and regulated 
features of casino games causally impact on pathological gambling rates and severity. As 
the perspective of Blaszczynski and Nower reminds us, however, questions about 
causality are inherently bound up with whether pathological gambling is a sui generis 
disorder or a secondary expression of less specific problems. To the extent that we expect 
the latter, then gambling regulatory policy may be the wrong instrument for addressing 
the public health issues.  
 
4. Neuroscience and molecular genetics to the rescue 
 
If current prevalence studies of pathological gambling by themselves shed little light on 
causal relationships, how might we do better both for the sake of scientific knowledge 
and improved treatment and policy? Brute force methodology, running controlled 
behavioral experiments on random subject samples in which suspected causal factors are 
systematically manipulated, is impractical due to the apparent low-frequency prevalence 
– much lower than formerly thought – of pathological gambling. The other way of 
inferring causes is to gather data by reference to an explicit causal model and then test the 
model using a tailored regression technique. To my knowledge this econometric approach 
has not yet been attempted in any pathological gambling prevalence study. There are two 
reasons for this. First, as noted, most pre-neuroscientific investigations of pathological 
gambling proceed on the basis of no underlying model. Second, the abstractness of the 
‘pathological gambling’ construct, along with its multifarious demonstrated 
comorbidities, gives rise to potentially vicious endogeneity problems for model 
estimation. It is likely that the dependent variable of ultimate interest – disposition to 
pathological gambling – is determined to different degrees by different observed 
independent variables and these in turn partly co-determine one another. This limitation 
forces most prevalence researchers (like most social psychologists) to be content with 
weak tests of significance (e.g T-tests) on correlations, unable to employ stronger 
econometric tests that aim to isolate causal structure. 
 
These problems are not insurmountable; on the cutting edge of gambling research they 
are indeed being gradually surmounted. As in cognitive and behavioral science generally, 
two disciplinary clusters are coming increasingly to the rescue: neuroscience and 
molecular genetics.  
 
Recent combined neurochemical and neuroeconomic models of addiction, specifically 
including gambling addiction, are surveyed in Ross et al (2008). It has been known for 
some time that addiction is correlated with abnormal levels of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine in ventral striatum. The dopamine circuit from midbrain to striatum has been 
more recently identified as responsible for predicting rewards, valuing potential rewards 
against alternatives, and preparing motor activity to procure rewards. New neuroimaging 
technologies yield sufficiently discriminating information about comparative 
neurotransmitter activity in addicts and non-addicts to test models of processes by which 
this circuit can capture the regulation of a person’s or rat’s molar behavior. All of these 
models share some general features. Essentially, they represent the mesolimbic dopamine 
reward system as gaining control of the organism’s molar behavior by chemically 
attenuating feedback serotonin (and other) circuits from frontal and prefrontal cortex 
which normally bid for attention to, and for scheduling consumption of, longer-range 
sources of reward. Fear responses from emotional centers such as the amygdala are also 
suppressed. The reward system achieves this mutiny by exploiting the discovery that, 
through relentlessly searching for cues to the arrival of an addictive target, and then 
organizing consumption of that target, it can reliably produce floods of dopamine in 
striatum. This constitutes the reward the system is evolved to maximize, which 
simultaneously overwhelms the functioning of normally rival circuits. 
 
People who report greatest behavioral disturbance with respect to gambling closely 
resemble drug addicts in having hyperactive striatal dopamine responses in the presence 
of cues for gambling (drugs), including their own fantasizing about gambling (drugs), and 
hypoactive opponent neurotransmitter responses. This explains why seriously afflicted 
pathological gamblers without comorbid substance abuse display behavioral tendencies 
familiar from drug addiction. It is hypothesized on this basis that some proportion of 
people diagnosed as pathological gamblers by the DSM criteria are neurochemically 
addicted to gambling. Given the tendency of DSM-based screens to identify false 
positives, it is thus probable that the screens tend to capture mixes of addicts and 
neurochemically normal frequent gamblers. In this way they fail to cut nature at scientific 
joints, whether by this idea we allude to a realist model of psychiatric natural kinds, or 
only to an ambition to write down reduced-form models that permit isolation of 
asymmetrically co-dependent variables that will be robust under econometric tests. In the 
interdisciplinary matrix of neuroeconomics, economists tend to emphasize empiricist 
virtues by pursuing the second aim. Neuroscientists tend to try to isolate real entities and 
mechanisms. This difference does not prevent them from jointly converging on a shared 
basis for dividing the normative concept of pathological gambling. 
 
Discovering that at least a subset of what psychiatrists have called pathological gambling 
is a pathology in the balance of power among neurotransmitter circuits is directly relevant 
to progress in understanding the disorder’s pathogenesis. There was already limited 
evidence from twin studies for a heritable aspect of pathological gambling. Based on 
examination of 3359 twin pairs, Eisen et al (1998) conclude that inherited factors explain 
between 35% and 54% of reports of five DSM symptoms that could be estimated 
statistically, 56% of the report of three or more symptoms, and 62% of diagnoses. 
Potenza et al (2005) find a matched genetic contribution with near-perfect overlap to 
pathological gambling and major depression, while Slutske et al (2000) report common 
genetic vulnerability to pathological gambling and alcohol dependence in male subjects. 
 
All of this is at best suggestive. Tracing the phenomenon of severe pathological gambling 
to the dopamine circuit, however, enables molecular geneticists to hone in on the possible 
biological explainers of these data. Ibáñez et al (2003) review seven association studies, 
all but one conducted by their group. An important property of their work is its 
motivation to provide separating evidence between conceptions of pathological gambling 
as an obsessive-compulsive disorder – the category in which DSM places pathological 
gambling but not drug addiction – and the family of dopaminergic pathologies that 
clearly include the classic addictions. In light of the reward system mutiny model, as they 
say, “genes relevant to the function of serotonergic, dopaminergic and noradrenergic 
systems could be considered as candidate genes in pathological gambling” (16). They 
find a promoter polymorphism sequence for expression of MOA-A protein, which has 
been associated with control of neurotransmitters found in the reward system, to be 
significantly increased in male pathological gamblers compared to controls. 
“Interestingly,” they comment, “although serotonin is a preferred substrate for MOA-A, 
MOA-A is expressed in the brain mainly in dopaminergic neurons, raising the question of 
whether these allele variants are more likely to result in changes in serotonergic or 
dopaminergic transmission” (18). This comports suggestively with the mutiny model, 
according to which it is attenuation of serotonin circuits by dopamine activity that 
mediates suppressed frontal control in addicts. In female pathological gamblers Perez de 
Castro et al (1997) discovered the DRD4 7-repeat allele, coding for less efficient 
receptors, to be significantly more frequent than in controls. Finally, Ibáñez et al cite a 
report due to Comings et al (1996) of “significant association between the Taq-A1 allele 
of the D2 dopamine receptor gene in pathological gamblers compared to controls,” and 
note that the Taq-A1 allele “has also been found to be associated with other impulsive-
addictive-compulsive behaviors, leading some researchers to propose a Reward 
Deficiency Syndrome as an underlying genetic foundation for these disorders” (Ibáñez et 
al 2003, 18).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The philosophical interpretation I suggest is best motivated by these developments is as 
follows. There is good reason, independent of issues that divide realists and empiricists, 
for reconceptualizing the phenomenon that DSM-IV operationalizes as pathological 
gambling as a specific manifestation of disruption in frontal-cortical control of the 
mesolimbic dopamine system’s influence on molar behavior. By this proposal I do not 
intend a baroque claim to the effect that the authors of DSM-IV always intended 
‘pathological gambling’ to refer to whatever unknown ‘constitutive essence’ unites the 
stereotypical cases, which has since turned out to be dopamine floods in ventral striatum. 
To the extent that it makes sense in the first place to talk about ‘intentions’ of ‘authors’ of 
referential conventions that emerge from complex institutional politics and evolving 
diagnostic practice over many years, these ‘intentions’ were highly unspecific, and 
should be inferred directly from the general function of the DSM. That function is to 
optimally facilitate and standardize clinical reference, diagnosis and treatment of cases of 
patients with common symptoms, common etiologies of disturbances, and common 
response modalities to a common set of related interventions, with greater weight given 
to those whose suffering is most severe and chronic. Then, I claim, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the largest proportion of those ‘intended’ (in this sense) to be 
diagnosed as pathological gamblers by the DSM operationalization, including almost all 
of those whose suffering is severe, chronic, and recalcitrant to low-intensity therapy, are 
afflicted with neuroadapted hypoactivity of serotonergic circuits that normally inhibit 
impulsive behavior, and dopaminergic reward circuits that have learned to obsessively 
pursue and attend to predictors of gambling opportunities. Because of this common 
condition, almost all PGs are candidates for a common neuropharmacological treatment, 
identification of which should be (as it now is) a priority in applied research. A priority in 
basic research on pathological gambling should be (as it now is) the refinement and 
generalization of relevant dopamine learning models, so as to improve both predictive 
power and the depth of our explanation and integration of pathological gambling in the 
wider context of the behavioral and brain sciences. 
 
This reduction of a social-behavioral syndrome to a relationship among neurotransmitter 
systems is not what philosophers often call ‘seamless’. Some patients to whom DSM-IV 
‘intended’ to class as pathological gamblers stand to be re-classified, though their social 
and behavioral problems remain as before. I believe that the case is typical in this respect, 
at least of all sciences that are partly regulated in their development by practical 
applications. 
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